Risky business by Petsko, Gregory A
My parents came of age during the Great Depression of 
the 1930s - you know, the economic catastrophe that 
was caused by the financial industry. (Oh yes, now that 
you mention it, the financial industry caused the latest 
one too. And most of the ones in between. Good thing 
we  finally  reformed  the  rules  regulating  that  industry 
and  put  the  worst  crooks  behind  bars  -  what  do  you 
mean, we didn’t?)
Well, one thing that is certain is that my parents - and 
their entire generation - were shaped by that experience 
as by nothing else in their lives. Even World War II didn’t 
have  the  effect  that  ten  years  of  worrying  about  the 
essentials (food, clothing, shelter) did. Sixty years after 
the post-war recovery (and both of them lived to see the 
millennium turn), they were still ultra-conservative with 
money, wasted not a scrap of food, and never believed 
that  good  fortune  was  anything  but  a  temporary 
phenomenon.
The lesson I learned from this is that times of scarcity 
make you risk-averse, and if you are risk-averse to begin 
with, they make you riskophobic, which is not a real word 
but ought to be, since ‘risk’ is actually derived from the 
Greek word for ‘cliff’, which anyone with a fear of heights 
(batophobia, which I know sounds like it should mean 
fear of bats, but it doesn’t; fear of bats is chiroptophobia) 
will tell you is worth being phobic about. While there is 
no official phobia for fear of risk-taking, there is one for 
fear of failure, which I would argue is pretty much the 
same thing. That word is atychiphobia, and you will find 
it in a list of known phobias somewhere between arachi-
butyro  phobia (fear of peanut butter sticking to the roof 
of  the  mouth)  and  aulophobia  (fear  of  flutes). 
(Personally,  I  would  have  thought  that  anyone  with 
peanut butter stuck to the roof of their mouth had good 
reason to fear flutes, but a discussion of that is probably 
best saved for a future column.)
Atychiphobia  is  rampant  in  many  quarters  in  this 
potentially Lost Economic Decade we’re living through, 
but nowhere will you find it more in evidence than in the 
government  agencies  that  fund  biomedical  research. 
They won’t admit it, of course (rhabdophobia - fear of 
being criticized), but they have become so conservative 
about how they give their money away, you’d swear they 
had harpaxophobia (fear of having one’s valuables stolen).
We’ve all encountered this, I suspect - I know I have. 
It’s gotten to the point where, in order to get a research 
proposal funded, you need to have already done nearly all 
the experiments you propose to do, so as to assure the 
people reviewing the grant that there is no possibility you 
won’t succeed. Incremental science tends to be favored in 
times like this because it’s safe. New ideas and difficult or 
ground-breaking experiments, on the other hand, have a 
much harder time being supported.
Now,  this  may  sound  like  I’m  being  critical  of  the 
bureaucrats who run the funding agencies, but actually, 
I’m  not.  For  the  most  part,  they  don’t  make  funding 
decisions on individual investigator-initiated grants. As 
Cassius might have put it had he been planning to submit 
a grant to the National Institutes of Health, ‘The fault, 
dear Brutus, lies not in our grant administrators, but in 
ourselves.’ Because, of course, the ranking of submitted 
research proposals is typically done by peer review, and if 
science  funding  has  become  a  game  that  only  conser-
vative research can win, we have no one to blame but us. 
When we criticize those who eschew risk in favor of safe 
science, we should be looking in a mirror.
The problem, of course, is that once things have gotten 
this way, it’s very hard to reverse the trend. Reviewing 
panels  are  already  filled  with  people  who  have  no 
memory  of  how  the  system  is  supposed  to  work.  It 
doesn’t take more than 5 to 10 years of tight funding for 
risk-aversion to become ingrained in the culture.
Which  is  why  a  soon-to-be-released  report  from 
econo  mists at the Sloane School at MIT ought to be must 
reading for everyone in Washington, because it suggests 
that there may be a structural way around the problem. 
The  study,  which  will  appear  in  the  RAND  Journal  of 
Economics, asserts that if scientists are given more time 
and latitude in their research - especially the freedom to 
fail  and  try  again  before  their  work  is  evaluated  for 
renewal - they will produce a significantly higher number 
of  high  impact  papers.  Pierre  Azoulay,  one  of  the 
coauthors for the study, says that good bosses understand 
this and make it clear to their employees that short-term 
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that  focus  on  short-term  success  -  exactly  the  sort  of 
culture we now find in scientific funding - often hinder 
creativity. To find out what sort of situations foster it, the 
authors  looked  at  two  groups  of  biologists  (including 
some  genome  biologists).  One  group  consisted  of 
investigators  funded  by  the  Howard  Hughes  Medical 
Institutes - a foundation whose stated approach is to fund 
people, not projects. Hughes Investigators are given five 
years of support at a time, but their renewal is based on 
how innovative they have been and the potential of the 
work  they  plan  to  do  to  propel  the  field  forward,  not 
whether  they  have  adhered  to  the  specific  goals  they 
listed at their last review. Reviewers are discouraged from 
critiquing the details of the proposal, and riskier projects 
are  more  likely  to  meet  with  favor  than  incremental 
science,  which  is  the  surest  way  to  get  an  Investigator 
discontinued. Failure to meet lofty goals is tolerated, in the 
short term, if the Investigator has a track record of getting 
the job done, or is trying to do something that is deemed 
of extraordinary significance if he or she can pull it off.
The  second  group  was  chosen  from  scientists  whose 
career  accomplishments  were  deemed  similar,  but  who 
were  primarily  supported  by  the  National  Institutes  of 
Health (NIH) through peer-reviewed proposals - that is, as 
part  of  the  risk-averse  culture  we’ve  just  talked  about. 
These biologists also typically receive five years of funding 
at a time, but their renewal is based on how well they meet 
the  specific  aims  they  proposed  when  the  project  was 
funded, and failure to do so by the end of the first funding 
period usually leads to the project not being renewed.
The study found that the first group produced twice as 
many high-impact papers as the members of the second 
group. (‘High impact’ was defined as being in the top 1% 
by citation index.) Interestingly enough, the first group 
was also more likely to produce papers that were of low 
impact, suggesting that they were failing about as often as 
they were succeeding, which was interpreted as indicat-
ing that they were taking many more risks.
We can criticize some aspects of this study, such as the 
use of citation frequency as a measure of impact (at least 
the  report’s  authors  didn’t  just  count  the  numbers  of 
papers  published  in  Nature,  Science  or  Cell),  and  we 
might wonder whether a truly comparable group of non-
Hughes Investigators was selected, but it certainly seems 
to make sense, doesn’t it? And I’m not the only one who 
thinks so. The Wellcome Trust, the largest supporter of 
biomedical research in Great Britain, launched a program 
two  years  ago  of  giving  flexible  grants  to  researchers, 
rather than supporting specific projects.
If NIH is serious about encouraging innovation; if the 
agency really wants high-risk/high-return research to be 
supported;  if  people  who  manage  scientific  funding 
realize that we scientists ourselves are the cause of the 
excessively conservative culture that pervades biomedical 
research, then the administrators in Washington should 
consider  making  structural  changes  that  foster  those 
aims.  They  can  start  by  forcing  senior  scientists  who 
receive  NIH  support  to  serve  on  grant  review  panels, 
thereby  providing  some  perspective  on  the  way  peer 
review is supposed to function. Furthermore, they can, 
for  people  with  a  demonstrated  track  record  of  high 
quality  science,  eliminate  the  need  to  provide  detailed 
descriptions  of  how  research  is  to  be  accomplished  or 
even require that specific aims be met as a condition for 
renewal. They can provide funding for up to seven years, 
not just five. And they can change the way renewal of 
such projects is evaluated. The only criteria that should 
matter ought to be: how important will the results of this 
work be if it is successful, and does this investigator have 
a  past  history  of  making  important  discoveries  and/or 
doing things that one would have thought were difficult 
or impossible to do. Among other benefits, such a system 
would encourage successful scientists to strike out into 
new  areas,  since  preliminary  data  would  be  much  less 
important than the likely significance of the work, and 
false starts would be tolerated if the eventual goal was 
transformative for the field.
Some may argue that NIH already has a system like this 
in  place,  the  so-called  Merit  Awards,  in  which  an 
investigator with a long record of good scores on a grant 
is  given  ten  years  of  funding  at  a  time,  supposedly  to 
encourage risks and provide leeway for false starts. I used 
to  think  that  program  was  a  great  step  in  the  right 
direction, until I learned of several recent cases in which 
Merit  awardees  had  their  next  year’s  funding  held  up 
until they had shown that they were making significant 
progress towards their original specific aims. Clearly, the 
culture of risk-aversion is spreading from the scientists 
who  review  one  another’s  proposals  to  the  program 
officers who administer the grants. Nothing but radical 
changes  in  the  structure  of  funding  at  least  some 
proposals will reverse this slide towards mediocrity.
I’m not proposing that NIH, or any other agency, put all 
its  resources  into  this  funding  model,  but  right  now, 
because of atychiphobia, it’s hardly putting any. I think 
that at least a quarter of all grants should be funded the 
way I suggested; a third would be better. I could discuss 
this  in  more  detail,  but  kopophobia  (fear  of  fatigue) 
prompts  me  to  stop  writing,  before  I  develop  ergasio-
phobia  (fear  of  work)  and  you  develop  hippopoto-
monstroses  quipedaliophobia, which I’m sure I don’t have 
to tell you, is fear of long words.
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